3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Matthias Gerstner
161f85b98b fix CVE-2025-46805: socket.c - don't send signals with root privileges
The CheckPid() function was introduced to address CVE-2023-24626, to
prevent sending SIGCONT and SIGHUP to arbitrary PIDs in the system. This
fix still suffers from a TOCTOU race condition. The client can replace
itself by a privileged process, or try to cycle PIDs until a privileged
process receives the original PID.

To prevent this, always send signals using the real privileges. Keep
CheckPid() for error diagnostics. If sending the actual signal fails
later on then there will be no more error reporting.

It seems the original bugfix already introduced a regression when
attaching to another's user session that is not owned by root. In this
case the target sessions runs with real uid X, while for sending a
signal to the `pid` provided by the client real uid Y (or root
privileges) are required.

This is hard to properly fix without this regression. On Linux pidfds
could be used to allow safely sending signals to other PIDs as root
without involving race conditions. In this case the client PID should
also be obtained via the UNIX domain socket's SO_PEERCRED option,
though.
2025-05-12 15:38:19 +02:00
Matthias Gerstner
e0eef5aac4 fix CVE-2025-46804: avoid file existence test information leaks
In setuid-root context the current error messages give away whether
certain paths not accessible by the real user exist and what type they
have. To prevent this only output generic error messages in setuid-root
context.

In some situations, when an error is pertaining a directory and the
directory is owner by the real user then we can still output more
detailed diagnostics.

This change can lead to less helpful error messages when Screen is
install setuid-root. More complex changes would be needed to avoid this
(e.g.  only open the `SocketPath` with raised privileges when
multi-attach is requested).

There might still be lingering some code paths that allow such
information leaks, since `SocketPath` is a global variable that is used
across the code base. The majority of issues should be caught with this
fix, however.
2025-05-12 15:26:11 +02:00
Matthias Gerstner
049b26b22e fix CVE-2025-46802: attacher.c - prevent temporary 0666 mode on PTYs
This temporary chmod of the PTY to mode 0666 is most likely a remnant of
past times, before the PTY file descriptor was passed to the target
session via the UNIX domain socket.

This chmod() causes a race condition during which any other user in the
system can open the PTY for reading and writing, and thus allows PTY
hijacking.

Simply remove this logic completely.
2025-05-12 15:15:38 +02:00
3 changed files with 54 additions and 67 deletions

View File

@@ -73,7 +73,6 @@ extern int MasterPid, attach_fd;
#ifdef MULTIUSER
extern char *multi;
extern int multiattach, multi_uid, own_uid;
extern int tty_mode, tty_oldmode;
# ifndef USE_SETEUID
static int multipipe[2];
# endif
@@ -160,9 +159,6 @@ int how;
if (pipe(multipipe))
Panic(errno, "pipe");
if (chmod(attach_tty, 0666))
Panic(errno, "chmod %s", attach_tty);
tty_oldmode = tty_mode;
eff_uid = -1; /* make UserContext fork */
real_uid = multi_uid;
if ((ret = UserContext()) <= 0)
@@ -174,11 +170,6 @@ int how;
Panic(errno, "UserContext");
close(multipipe[1]);
read(multipipe[0], &dummy, 1);
if (tty_oldmode >= 0)
{
chmod(attach_tty, tty_oldmode);
tty_oldmode = -1;
}
ret = UserStatus();
#ifdef LOCK
if (ret == SIG_LOCK)
@@ -224,9 +215,6 @@ int how;
xseteuid(multi_uid);
xseteuid(own_uid);
#endif
if (chmod(attach_tty, 0666))
Panic(errno, "chmod %s", attach_tty);
tty_oldmode = tty_mode;
}
# endif /* USE_SETEUID */
#endif /* MULTIUSER */
@@ -423,13 +411,6 @@ int how;
ContinuePlease = 0;
# ifndef USE_SETEUID
close(multipipe[1]);
# else
xseteuid(own_uid);
if (tty_oldmode >= 0)
if (chmod(attach_tty, tty_oldmode))
Panic(errno, "chmod %s", attach_tty);
tty_oldmode = -1;
xseteuid(real_uid);
# endif
}
#endif
@@ -505,14 +486,6 @@ AttacherFinit SIGDEFARG
close(s);
}
}
#ifdef MULTIUSER
if (tty_oldmode >= 0)
{
if (setuid(own_uid))
Panic(errno, "setuid");
chmod(attach_tty, tty_oldmode);
}
#endif
exit(0);
SIGRETURN;
}

View File

@@ -230,8 +230,6 @@ char *multi_home;
int multi_uid;
int own_uid;
int multiattach;
int tty_mode;
int tty_oldmode = -1;
#endif
char HostName[MAXSTR];
@@ -1009,9 +1007,6 @@ int main(int ac, char** av)
/* ttyname implies isatty */
SetTtyname(true, &st);
#ifdef MULTIUSER
tty_mode = (int)st.st_mode & 0777;
#endif
fl = fcntl(0, F_GETFL, 0);
if (fl != -1 && (fl & (O_RDWR|O_RDONLY|O_WRONLY)) == O_RDWR)
@@ -1127,15 +1122,28 @@ int main(int ac, char** av)
#endif
}
if (stat(SockPath, &st) == -1)
Panic(errno, "Cannot access %s", SockPath);
else
if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))
if (stat(SockPath, &st) == -1) {
if (eff_uid == real_uid) {
Panic(errno, "Cannot access %s", SockPath);
} else {
Panic(0, "Error accessing %s", SockPath);
}
} else if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
if (eff_uid == real_uid || st.st_uid == real_uid) {
Panic(0, "%s is not a directory.", SockPath);
} else {
Panic(0, "Error accessing %s", SockPath);
}
}
#ifdef MULTIUSER
if (multi) {
if ((int)st.st_uid != multi_uid)
Panic(0, "%s is not the owner of %s.", multi, SockPath);
if ((int)st.st_uid != multi_uid) {
if (eff_uid == real_uid || st.st_uid == real_uid) {
Panic(0, "%s is not the owner of %s.", multi, SockPath);
} else {
Panic(0, "Error accessing %s", SockPath);
}
}
}
else
#endif
@@ -1149,9 +1157,13 @@ int main(int ac, char** av)
Panic(0, "You are not the owner of %s.", SockPath);
#endif
}
if ((st.st_mode & 0777) != 0700)
Panic(0, "Directory %s must have mode 700.", SockPath);
if ((st.st_mode & 0777) != 0700) {
if (eff_uid == real_uid || st.st_uid == real_uid) {
Panic(0, "Directory %s must have mode 700.", SockPath);
} else {
Panic(0, "Error accessing %s", SockPath);
}
}
if (SockMatch && index(SockMatch, '/'))
Panic(0, "Bad session name '%s'", SockMatch);
SockName = SockPath + strlen(SockPath) + 1;
@@ -1189,8 +1201,14 @@ int main(int ac, char** av)
else
exit(9 + (fo || oth ? 1 : 0) + fo);
}
if (fo == 0)
Panic(0, "No Sockets found in %s.\n", SockPath);
if (fo == 0) {
if (eff_uid == real_uid || st.st_uid == real_uid) {
Panic(0, "No Sockets found in %s.\n", SockPath);
} else {
Panic(0, "Error accessing %s", SockPath);
}
}
Msg(0, "%d Socket%s in %s.", fo, fo > 1 ? "s" : "", SockPath);
eexit(0);
}
@@ -2170,20 +2188,6 @@ DEFINE_VARARGS_FN(Panic)
if (D_userpid)
Kill(D_userpid, SIG_BYE);
}
#ifdef MULTIUSER
if (tty_oldmode >= 0) {
# ifdef USE_SETEUID
if (setuid(own_uid))
xseteuid(own_uid); /* may be a loop. sigh. */
# else
setuid(own_uid);
# endif
debug1("Panic: changing back modes from %s\n", attach_tty);
chmod(attach_tty, tty_oldmode);
}
#endif
eexit(1);
}

View File

@@ -169,8 +169,13 @@ bool *is_sock;
xsetegid(real_gid);
#endif
if ((dirp = opendir(SockPath)) == 0)
Panic(errno, "Cannot opendir %s", SockPath);
if ((dirp = opendir(SockPath)) == 0) {
if (eff_uid == real_uid) {
Panic(errno, "Cannot opendir %s", SockPath);
} else {
Panic(0, "Error accessing %s", SockPath);
}
}
slist = 0;
slisttail = &slist;
@@ -826,6 +831,11 @@ int pid;
return UserStatus();
}
static void KillUnpriv(pid_t pid, int sig) {
UserContext();
UserReturn(kill(pid, sig));
}
#ifdef hpux
/*
* From: "F. K. Bruner" <napalm@ugcs.caltech.edu>
@@ -911,14 +921,14 @@ struct win *wi;
{
Msg(errno, "Could not perform necessary sanity checks on pts device.");
close(i);
Kill(pid, SIG_BYE);
KillUnpriv(pid, SIG_BYE);
return -1;
}
if (strcmp(ttyname_in_ns, m->m_tty))
{
Msg(errno, "Attach: passed fd does not match tty: %s - %s!", ttyname_in_ns, m->m_tty[0] != '\0' ? m->m_tty : "(null)");
close(i);
Kill(pid, SIG_BYE);
KillUnpriv(pid, SIG_BYE);
return -1;
}
/* m->m_tty so far contains the actual name of the pts device in the
@@ -935,19 +945,19 @@ struct win *wi;
{
Msg(errno, "Attach: passed fd does not match tty: %s - %s!", m->m_tty, myttyname ? myttyname : "NULL");
close(i);
Kill(pid, SIG_BYE);
KillUnpriv(pid, SIG_BYE);
return -1;
}
}
else if ((i = secopen(m->m_tty, O_RDWR | O_NONBLOCK, 0)) < 0)
{
Msg(errno, "Attach: Could not open %s!", m->m_tty);
Kill(pid, SIG_BYE);
KillUnpriv(pid, SIG_BYE);
return -1;
}
#ifdef MULTIUSER
if (attach)
Kill(pid, SIGCONT);
KillUnpriv(pid, SIGCONT);
#endif
#if defined(ultrix) || defined(pyr) || defined(NeXT)
@@ -960,7 +970,7 @@ struct win *wi;
{
write(i, "Attaching from inside of screen?\n", 33);
close(i);
Kill(pid, SIG_BYE);
KillUnpriv(pid, SIG_BYE);
Msg(0, "Attach msg ignored: coming from inside.");
return -1;
}
@@ -971,7 +981,7 @@ struct win *wi;
{
write(i, "Access to session denied.\n", 26);
close(i);
Kill(pid, SIG_BYE);
KillUnpriv(pid, SIG_BYE);
Msg(0, "Attach: access denied for user %s.", user);
return -1;
}
@@ -1289,7 +1299,7 @@ ReceiveMsg()
Msg(0, "Query attempt with bad pid(%d)!", m.m.command.apid);
}
else {
Kill(m.m.command.apid,
KillUnpriv(m.m.command.apid,
(queryflag >= 0)
? SIGCONT
: SIG_BYE); /* Send SIG_BYE if an error happened */